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Crosby potentially presented the Court with just that opportunity. The First Circuit below had rested its decision striking down Massachusetts' Burma sanctions law on a particularly expansive form of federal power: dormant foreign affairs preemption.6 First appearing in Zschernig v. Miller,7 this doctrine requires federal courts to invalidate state laws-in the absence of any federal preempting statutes or actions-that interfere with the national government's power over international relations.8 Zschernig is not just a prudential or procedural rule; it symbolizes a deeper structural understanding of the balance of power between the federal and state governments. Zschernig rests on the idea that the nation preceded the states and that, therefore, the federal government is vested with all of the powers of national sovereignty-a notion that can trace itself not just to Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,9 but also to the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton and the High Federalists of the framing period.10 Zschernig thus reverses the presumption of the Tenth Amendment and the implications of a Constitution of limited federal powers.
Instead, this decision reserves to the federal government all powers in foreign affairs not specifically granted to the states.11 Just as the dormant Commerce Clause, from which it draws obvious strength, has come under criticism by some of the Justices,12 so too has the dormant foreign affairs doctrine recently received sharp academic questioning by those who argue that it makes no sense in light of the Court's recent federalism decisions. 13 In Crosby, however, the Court avoided the question of whether the national government's dominance in foreign affairs would survive in The same reasons why the Court favors the President, however, would lead it to reject a vigorous dormant foreign affairs doctrine. First, let me sketch out why courts and many scholars have long favored presidential control of foreign affairs. The obvious reason is that the Executive branch enjoys clear structural superiorities in the conduct of international relations.
It is helpful here to examine the theories developed by political scientists and economists that attempt to model international relations. Put simply, these scholars begin with the assumption that the international system is governed by anarchy in which nations seek to maximize their security and power.29 Realists believe that this situation leads nations to secure their survival through the unilateral buildup of their armed forces.30 Others, sometimes known as institutionalists, believe that even in a state of anarchy, nations may engage in forms of cooperation that allow them to overcome prisoners' dilemmas in areas such as trade and the environment.31
Despite their differences, both realists and institutionalists assume that nation-states employ a rational actor approach to national security decision-making. The primary requirement for the study of national strategy, according to Thomas Schelling's classic work, The Strategy of Conflict, is "the assumption of rational behavior-not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior . . . motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system."32 The nation -state ideally is a rational, unitary decision-maker that can identify threats, develop responses and evaluate the costs and benefits which arise from different policy options.33 The rational actor translates broad national security interests into more discrete goals, which it then seeks to achieve by adopting value-maximizing policies and actions.34
International relations scholars have identified several institutional structures that lead to the effective exercise of power to achieve foreign policy goals. Nation-states require organizations that recognize the values and objectives that are to be maximized, that can identify and to have a communications system in good order, to have complete information, or to be in full command of one's own actions or of one's own assets."36 While this model, no doubt, is difficult to achieve in the real world-bureaucratic or political imperatives may distort policy, certain issues may allow domestic interests to overcome the national interest as identified by the rational actor-it remains an ideal that some theorists believe ought to guide effective foreign policy.37 It seems obvious that, in the modern world, only the Presidency meets the requirements of the rational national actor.
One can see the influences of this ideal even before its formal expression in recent political science. In Curtiss-Wright, for example, the Court famously (or notoriously) observed: "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."38 Quoting from a Senate report, Justice Sutherland further explained that "[t]he nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch."39 Such ideas can trace their origins in American political thought as far back as Alexander Hamilton, who wrote in The Federalist No. 70 that "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."40 As a result, the Framers vested the President with the Commander-in-Chief power, the power to make treatises with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the power to conduct diplomatic relations.41 Therefore, the history of American foreign relations and the American presidency has been the story of the If we accept this ideal of foreign relations decision-making, then it seems clear that a vigorous dormant foreign relations doctrine, of the sort suggested by Zschernig and avoided in Crosby, falls short. If there is any institution in our national government that would fail the unitary, rational actor test, it is the federal judiciary. The federal courts operate as a slow, decentralized, and at times, irrational bureaucracy. Take the makeup of the federal courts as an example. There are ninety-four district courts, composed of at least 647 independent judges.43 Each of these courts can hold ninety-four different opinions concerning the question of whether a state law interferes with national foreign policy objectives. There are thirteen federal courts of appeals, with 179 judges.44 Due to the Court's sparing use of its certiorari jurisdiction, these judges represent the court of last resort for more than 99% of all cases brought in federal court. 45 Until the Supreme Court chooses to intervene, each of these circuit courts of appeals can enforce different opinions on foreign policy and state law.
The federal judiciary is not only decentralized, but also, in comparison to the Presidency, it is slow and error-prone. Federal courts are notorious for the lengthy delays-often amounting to yearsbetween the filing of a case and the issuance of a judgment. Such delay, when combined with decentralization, prevents the judicial system as an organization from communicating effectively among its units and correcting errors. The mechanism within the federal judiciary for such feedback is the appeal system. 46 Finally, if the Court were to recognize a more vigorous dormant foreign a ffairs power, the nature of the federal judiciary would undermine the effort to promote rationality in our foreign affairs decision-making. Federal courts simply do not enjoy the flexibility needed to constantly calculate costs and benefits in foreign policy and to adjust the creation and implementation of policy to meet changes in those calculations. Once the courts perceive a mandate arising out of the Constitution or a statute, they have a duty to promote that federal directive in the context of an Article III case or controversy. They have no discretion to adjust those policies without some command from the political branches, regardless of the likely effect on American foreign policy. A rational, unitary decision-maker can take into account new policy goals, new costs and new benefits, but a federal court cannot. The nature of the litigation process only compounds these problems. Litigation is run by interested parties that have no obligation to provide all of the information that a rational decision-maker might need to reach the best policy choice. Rather, litigation may witness the use of procedures to harass or delay, the failure to reach compromises and the creation of greater uncertainty and inconsistency. 47 Given all of these characteristics in the federal judicial system and the judicial process, it is not obvious that we should want the courts to make decisions concerning our foreign policy. Decisions in this area can carry heavier consequences than domestic issues. If we want to establish an effective decision-making process for foreign affairs matters, the Court may wish to consider whether the federal courts are as equally disorganized and discordant as the states. When it chooses to confront the dormant foreign affairs p ower directly, the Court perhaps may decide to defer to the better-equipped political branches, rather than itself, to make foreign policy for the nation.
